Friction is a characteristic of war, and the military coalitions that prosecute them are not immune from its effects. National priorities and rules of engagement may impact targeting considerations, risk acceptance or the willingness to conduct certain tasks. But the nations that join together to fight wars generally agree on what the strategic aim of the conflict is.
What has been noteworthy about the US-Israeli coalition prosecuting their war against Iran, has been the increasingly public differences between the objectives they are both pursuing. The US Secretary of War Peter Hegseth, when asked about Israel’s targeting of oil storage facilities near Iran’s capital that unleashed a large and dense pall of smoke over Tehran said that “Where they [Israel] have different objectives, they’ve pursued them. Ultimately, we’ve stayed focused on ours.”
Later, after Israel targeted Iran’s South Pars gas field resulting in a retaliatory strike against Qatari energy infrastructure, US President Donald Trump took to his Truth Social platform to say that he knew nothing about the attack and “No more attacks will be made by Israel.” Of course the idea that during an extended air campaign with the need for significant air space and targeting deconfliction, that the United States would have been unaware of an Israeli attack on South Pars, is not really credible.
The reality is that Israel is pursuing a maximalist agenda, with an ideal outcome of regime change in Tehran. Trump’s agenda is likely less ambitious and certainly less well articulated. Regardless, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu believes that in Trump there is finally an incumbent in the White House who shares his belief in direct military force against Iran and in tactical victories without much concern about strategic consequences. It is an opportunity that he has no intention of squandering.
As a result, Tel Aviv regularly pursues its own agenda in prosecuting attacks against Iran. Tulsi Gabbard, the Director of National Intelligence told the House Intelligence Committee last week that the goals laid out by Israel for their attacks against Iran are different than those set out by Trump. In particular Israel was focused on killing Iran’s political and military leadership, while the United States was focused on Iranian ballistic missile capabilities, their production and the Iranian Navy. She was unaware of Israel’s willingness to support Washington’s desire for a negotiated outcome or of Tel Aviv’s willingness to support Trump’s call not to attack Iranian energy infrastructure.
Outside the coalition of two, there is little support for the war. Even Washington’s traditional allies have found it difficult to provide other than rhetorical support, and even this is rather lukewarm. Even among Americans, polls show that while Trump’s support base endorses the war, most Americans don’t. This opposition is not only because of the way Trump failed to prepare the political ground for a decision that is the most important that any president can make, but also because of a feeling that Washington and Tel Aviv are pursuing mostly overlapping, but not necessarily common objectives.
To some extent it suits both countries’ purposes to have Israel be seen as the one carrying out political assassinations and targeting economic infrastructure, while Washington focuses more on military targets. The idea of plausible deniability on the part of Washington would have been attractive, however Tehran’s response to attacks on its economic infrastructure, and the consequences of that being felt in the global economy, has resulted in a situation where not only Washington’s allies but a sceptical domestic population is becoming increasingly agitated at the impact of a war they didn’t ask for or want. Tehran’s response was easily foreseen, but warnings were likely not given enough weight by the White House.
For all the talk of a rift between Israel and the United States though, there is little practical indication of it other than some vaguely critical Truth Social posts by the US president. The real tension is likely to manifest itself when the decision to cease military operations is taken. Netanyahu remains convinced that the regime can fall if sufficient military pressure is applied to it and sufficient Iranian military and security assets destroyed or degraded. It also believes that it can further degrade Hezbollah the longer it can pummel Lebanon. Washington appears less convinced that the regime can fall and is far more concerned with the economic costs of a war without a decisive victory, or a negotiated end that Trump can portray as victory. Each of Washington’s and Tel Aviv’s desired goals require different levels of military pressure over different periods of time, but it will be the White House that ultimately decides when the bombing stops. And when that happens it is likely that nobody’s goals will have been achieved.
Dr Rodger Shanahan is a Middle East analyst.
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